How to Avoid Misunderstanding Chinese Nuclear Weapons Policy
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During a recent presentation on whether the world is “destined for a Cold War in the 21st century,” one of the panelists drew attention to a sentence from an authoritative Chinese document that said China decided to “accelerate the development of strategic deterrent capabilities.” A colleague walked away from the presentation with the impression “strategic deterrent capabilities” refered to nuclear weapons. That’s highly unlikely.
Chinese military texts consistently use the term “strategic” to refer to other types of weapons, including conventional missiles, anti-satellite weapons, cyber weapons, and emerging technologies like artificial intelligence that Chinese decisionmakers believe may have decisive impacts in a future conflict. For example, in a highly classified training manual for the officers of China’s missile forces, published by the General Command of the People’s Liberation Army in 2003, the authors emphasized, “All of the operations of the Second Artillery (now called the PLA Rocket Forces), regardless of the scale of activity, have strategic significance.” They told the officers that any use of China’s missile forces “directly affects the course and final outcome of the greater success or failure of the national political, military and diplomatic struggle holding together the safety and fate of the nation.”
In the United States, the use of the word “strategic” often serves as a euphemism for nuclear weapons, especially when paired with the word “deterrence.” But for the Chinese military, “strategic” serves as a synonym for “critical”—something essential in determining the outcome of a conflict.
In his report to the 20th Party Congress in the fall of 2022, Xi Jinping discussed the party’s efforts to “create a strategic deterrent capability system” that included space, cyber, and other new warfighting capabilities such as autonomous weapons. The sentence quoted during the presentation was from a document summarizing decisions taken at the third plenum of the 20th Party Congress, which was held this past July. This summer’s document more or less repeated what Xi said on strategic deterrence capabilities two years ago.
An interpretation of what Xi meant by this uniquely Chinese term, written by a professor from China’s National University of Defense Technology and published shortly after Xi’s 2022 report, noted, “The US strategic deterrent system has been further expanded from traditional nuclear forces to include new types of strategic nuclear weapons, conventional global quick-strike weapons, missile defense weapons, anti-satellite weapons, and integrated, networked strategic information systems covering the entire globe.”
Like the professor who interpreted Xi’s comments, generations of Chinese communist leaders felt the United States was setting the pace and direction of technological development. Influential Chinese scientists warned their leaders that China was falling too far behind. In the mid-1980s, Chinese leaders, acting on the advice of a large team of Chinese scientists, initiated a long-term program of reform aimed at narrowing the technological gap between China and the United States. Efforts to modernize the scientific and technological foundations of Chinese national defense capabilities was one part of this comprehensive development effort, which was primarily focused on the economy.
This long-established national reform program, which continues to prioritize economic development, was reaffirmed during the third plenum of the 20th Party Congress. So, the statement in this summer’s plenum report on “accelerating the development of a strategic deterrent capability” was not referring to a new or urgent initiative narrowly focused on China’s nuclear forces. It was one of several brief recommendations on military affairs included in a comprehensive 21-page public document entitled “Decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Further Comprehensively Deepening Reform and Promoting Chinese Modernization.” This strongly suggests the statement was simply a short formulaic reference to Xi’s 2022 reiteration of the Chinese communist leadership’s decades-old effort to keep pace with US advances in a range of new defense capabilities.
It can be argued that simply asking the question of whether the world is “destined” for another Cold War makes it more likely. The question circumscribes discussion of the current situation in a way that elevates one possible negative outcome over all others. This can make the misinterpretation of statements from Chinese decisionmakers more likely by associating them with the nuclear arms race of the past. I feel confident that it was not the intent of the presenters or the organizers, who hope to avoid the destiny their title compels us to imagine.
It might be more efficacious to focus on a positive future outcome where a new nuclear arms race is avoided, and then develop strategies decisionmakers can use to realize it. Encouraging everyone participating in such an effort to empathize with their imagined enemy is a good place to start. Trying to see the world through the other’s eyes can help concerned observers better understand the thoughts that lie behind their decisions and actions. Developing the capacity to empathize with Chinese leaders might begin with more careful consideration of the language they use to communicate their intentions to each other, especially in important party documents.