Putting Science to Work for Security: A Call to Prevent Nuclear Testing

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At the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), we work to transform rigorous, fact-based science into policies that create a safer, healthier world for everyone. When science is under attack and ignored in policymaking, our collective security is threatened and we risk senselessly backsliding towards some of the most dangerous parts of our history.

Nuclear brinkmanship in the form of tit-for-tat demonstrations of hellish and deadly weapons are relics of the 20th century arms race and best left in the past. The United States conducted 1,030 nuclear weapons tests from 1945 through 1992—more than any other nation—and yet there are murmurs from our nation’s capital that the United States should resume this dangerous and destabilizing practice.

This is a clear-cut case in which science offers a safer alternative. The role of scientists in defending and advocating responsible policy is more important now than ever before.

With that in mind, I recently lent my expertise to support a Nevada state resolution (AJR13) that encourages the federal government to uphold the current moratorium on nuclear testing at the Nevada National Security Site, where most US tests took place. I hope my statement serves as an example of how scientists can put their voices and expertise to use in protecting past gains and our collective future. You can join us in putting your expertise to use by joining the UCS Science Network.

Here is the full text of my testimony:

My name is Dylan Spaulding. I am a senior scientist in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists and am an expert in the materials science and physics related to the design and stewardship of nuclear weapons. My professional training is in the science of nuclear stockpile stewardship. I’m here to speak in support of AJR13.

I can confidently attest that resumption of underground explosive nuclear testing by the United States is scientifically unnecessary, would be strategically damaging for US security, and could pose unnecessary risks to workers and members of the public in Nevada.

The US national laboratories, along with the Nevada National Security Site, maintain scientific capabilities that are far superior to what was available during the era of full-scale explosive nuclear tests. Today, non-nuclear laboratory experiments can attain conditions comparable to those achieved in a nuclear weapon and can do so in a far more refined and precise manner without threatening or violating international norms.

Whereas past nuclear tests were conducted primarily to validate a given weapon design, today’s laboratory and computational capabilities allow scientists to understand the underlying processes in exquisite detail. The National Nuclear Security Administration and national laboratory directors have confidently relied on these laboratory and computational tools to certify the safety, security, and reliability of the US nuclear stockpile for more than two decades, and themselves attest that a return to testing is neither desirable nor required. 

The United States currently maintains a relative technical advantage with regard to testing, having amassed more nuclear testing data than any other nation. To resume nuclear testing would only open the door for nations with less testing expertise and less sophisticated nuclear stockpiles to close that gap, which would be to the detriment of the United States. Doing so would also shatter the global norm against testing that every nation except North Korea has abided by for nearly 30 years.

Finally, even underground explosive nuclear tests are inherently dangerous and polluting. Test sites are not remediated after the fact, and more than 32 past underground tests conducted in Nevada breached their confinement, “venting” radioactivity to the atmosphere where it potentially put Nevadans at risk. A test conducted rapidly as a demonstrative show of force may be more likely to circumvent necessary environmental and site surveys that could ensure such accidents don’t occur again. Given that Las Vegas is only 65 miles from the Nevada National Security Site, potential impacts should be carefully considered.

In closing, there is virtually no scientific or military necessity to return to testing to maintain or ensure the US nuclear arsenal. Doing so would only introduce risk to the region, open the door for further testing by potential adversaries, and damage US credibility for future arms control agreements.